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Abstract—The radio architectures of and protocols used by
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are, typically, very similar and
are based on IEEE 802.15.4. By concentrating on this standard
and the associated employed security techniques, the possibility of
designing a transferable safety and privacy enhancement across
protocols and services, becomes a reality. WSN applications
have expanded significantly over the past decade or so and
adopt commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices and publicly
available standards, which inherently creates intruder incentives
and security challenges. Securing WSNs is a critical requirement
due to the challenging burden of protecting the transmitted
sensitive information across various applications, while operating
under unique security vulnerabilities and a fluctuating radio
frequency (RF) spectrum and physical environment. Couple this
aspect with establishing a level of trust among network nodes,
while providing resilience to interference, it becomes clear that
maintaining security is challenging. This paper identifies unique
vulnerabilities in WSNs, which have a direct impact on privacy
and safety. The prevalent security techniques used in the common
PHY and MAC layers of various WSN protocols are discussed
in terms of providing the essential security requirements. An
experimental visualization of the coexistence issues in the indus-
trial, scientific and medical (ISM) RF band, which is integral
for IoT operations, is provided as an introduction to a new
perspective on attacking WSNs. Fundamental attack styles and
spectrum sharing/coexistence based intrusions are presented.
Typical methods, which use COTS devices and open source
software to exploit WSN security holes, are also discussed.
Index Terms—Interference, Intrusion, IoT, MAC, Packet, PHY,
Protocol, Security, & WSN.
I. INTRODUCTION
As Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) continue to develop
into an indispensable component of modern technology and
as the radio frequency (RF) spectrum becomes increasingly
congested, the enhanced security of the communication link
evolves into a necessity. Applications and innovative solutions
continue to use WSNs to permit easier design, installation and
maintenance, while simultaneously providing new deployment
options. Since WSN utilization has expanded, new challenges
in terms of security materialize due to the rise of stricter
operational and availability requirements. This is evident in
various innovative applications based on over a decade of
research and development, like, spaced-based WSNs [1], the
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Internet of Things (IoT), wireless networked control systems
(WNCS) [2] and C4ISRT systems [3].
These applications combined with coexistence issues in
the 2.4GHz industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio
frequency (RF) band, due to expanding numbers of connected
devices, add layers of complexity to security issues. The
various applications and the ISM band coupled with the trend
of using available commercial off the shelf (COTS) devices
and publicly known standardized protocols, demonstrates the
essential need for security in each WSN protocol in use.
Consequently, network compromise, whether malicious or
unintentional, can have significant consequences for privacy
and safety. Therefore, the security and availability of the com-
munication link and the delivery of authentic and confidential
packets are essential for safety critical WSNs.
This paper analyzes the unique vulnerabilities of WSNs in
order to incentivize the need for security enhancements. The
main WSN protocols in use are identified and their common
packet and signal structures are investigated in terms of em-
ployed security techniques. The security feature is expanded
through a real world visualization of the coexistence issue in
the ISM RF band and acts as an introduction to a unique
WSN attack style. Fundamental attack styles focused on the
employed security in the PHY and MAC layers are defined
to demonstrate the severity of the safety and privacy issue in
WSNs. Example methods of exploiting WSN vulnerabilities
are also provided, along with suitable low-cost COTS devices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II describes WSNs and their associated applications. Section
III characterizes unique WSN security vulnerabilities. Section
IV defines IEEE 802.15.4 and how it links WSN protocols.
Section V specifies the main security techniques employed,
while section VI illustrates how these security techniques are
exploited. Finally, section VII concludes this paper.
II. WSN DESCRIPTION & APPLICATIONS
WSNs consist of multiple lightweight devices (nodes) used
to sense the physical world and, typically, incorporate a
radio transceiver, a micro-controller, sensors and a limited
energy source. These nodes gather data from their environment
and, often, collaborate together to transmit the sensed data
to a centralized sink or cluster head. Main characteristics
include energy usage, handling node failures, nodes joining
and heterogeneity of nodes, operating in harsh conditions,
ability to scale and incorporating mobile nodes. A general
network communication approach is provided in Fig. 1, where
a WSN protocol is used for communications between the
sensing devices and coordinator, which acts as an access point
for network users to capture and analyze data and permit the
use of a network/security manager. Transmission between the
access point and other components is usually achieved through
internet access but can include cellular, wired connections and
more computationally powerful relay nodes, for example, Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites as a WSN component [4].
WSNs operate either a star, mesh or peer-to-peer topology
and, in each case, are self-organizing, self-repairing, dynamic
and can exploit the cluster head approach. Individual devices
can be either a full function device (FFD), which act as
a Personal Area Network (PAN) coordinator, router or end
device, or a reduced function device (RFD), which act as a
simple sensing end device. A FFD can communicate with
other FFDs or RFDs, while a RFD can only communicate
with one FFD. Two or more of these devices (minimum of
one FFD as coordinator) operating on the same channel and
within a personal operation space form a wireless PAN. Each
PAN selects an unique identifier (PANId) and all devices have
an unique 64-bit address. An example mesh topology, which
exploits clustering, is provided in Fig. 2. This typical WSN
approach can use data aggregation techniques at routers or
relay nodes to minimize communication overhead and maxi-
mize energy efficiency. Generally, this is achieved by unifying
several data items into a single packet, applying compression
techniques or processing data at the relay nodes. A network
manager is responsible for the configuration between nodes
and a security manager is responsible for key management.
WSN applications are diverse and, according to [3], can be
classified into precision agriculture, environmental monitoring,
vehicle tracking, health care, smart buildings, military and
animal tracking. Expansions exist and include aerospace [5],
space-based applications [1], the ever expanding IoT, wireless
body area networks (WBANs) and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVS) [6]. Evidently WSNs require security across a wide
range of physical environments, deployments scenarios and
structures, in which privacy and safety are pivotal. Further-
more, these applications can be valuable and, typically, use
sensitive data, which incentivize malicious actors to intention-
ally disrupt or compromise network operation. This coupled
with unique WSN vulnerabilities, provided in section III,
demonstrates the difficulty in guaranteeing security.
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Fig. 2. Example WSN mesh topology utilizing a cluster approach
III. WSN SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
WSNs require security, particularly when the networks are
designed for use in hostile environments and critical appli-
cations, like military or IoT, which have strict security and
availability requirements. When WSNs are analyzed in terms
of their construction, deployment and usage, certain unique
security vulnerabilities become apparent. This indicates that
securing WSNs appropriately is more difficult when com-
pared to other wireless/wired networks. Furthermore, WSNs
are susceptible to various attack styles, including jamming,
eavesdropping and tampering. Therefore, when providing the
necessary security requirements, it is clear that WSNs will
not be 100% secure and as WSNs become more integrated in
modern applications, possibilities exists that security enhance-
ments are required. These vulnerabilities, partially identified
in [7], are expanded and summarized below:
• Open Interface: Generally, WSN protocols are unavoidably
known publicly due to the requirement for interoperability
and use of standardized open access protocols. Additionally,
the wireless channel is open to anyone with suitable equip-
ment, resulting in an increased susceptibility to attacks.
• Device Resources: Typically WSN devices operate on a
constrained energy supply and, for reasons of cost, have low
processing power, meaning computationally expensive proto-
cols/techniques are not employed. The use of COTS devices
is seen as relevant given the general trends towards using
these devices in applications where high redundancy high
replenishment rate is favored over custom built components.
• Hostile Environments: WSNs are regularly deployed and left
unattended in harsh environmental conditions without any
fixed infrastructure, where it is difficult to have continued
surveillance [8]. This strategy means legitimate nodes are
potentially physically available to being captured and/or
tampered with by attackers, leading to a high probability of
node secrets being discovered and specific nodes becoming
malicious. Tamper proofing nodes is possible, but, for rea-
sons of cost, may not be appropriate and, so, encryption keys
may be obtained from device memory. Typically, the physical
environment contains varying fading levels, obstacles, path
losses and spurious interference, while the RF spectrum
changes rapidly as it adjusts to the number of connected
devices, demand, packet size and services in operation. These
non-malicious factors coupled with the availability of nodes,
increases the probability of network compromise.
• Topology [8]: Network topologies constantly change due to
variations in the environment (fading levels, obstacles, path
losses, spurious interference etc.), the natural dynamic nature
of WSNs or damage/“death” of network nodes. This WSN
feature can be exploited by potential attackers who wish to
either gain access or cause spurious harm to the network.
• Hardware Availability: As hardware becomes increasingly
available at more cost effective prices, potential attackers can
prepare and develop attacks using real-world WSN hardware,
which provides an increased chance of attacker success.
Additionally, the computational ability of available devices
is expanding, leading to advanced attack styles. This was
illustrated when a low-cost software defined radio (SDR)
caused matched protocol interference in a WSN in [9].
• Deployment Diversification: As the application space of
WSNs continues to expand into new frontiers, a more
diverse range of deployments becomes the norm. WSNs were
traditionally involved in monitoring applications but have
now extended into space operations, WBANs and UAVS etc.
The potential uses and critical data of these innovative appli-
cations create security and spectral coexistence challenges.
IV. WSN PROTOCOLS
To understand WSN operation and the security techniques
which help to overcome the vulnerabilities outlined in sec-
tion III, the protocols which govern the operation of these
networks must be analyzed. Multiple protocols are used in
WSNs and the main available technologies include ZigBee,
WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, 6LoWPAN, Thread and MiWi.
Presently, these protocols are used in applications as men-
tioned in section II and are the most prominent participants
of the expansion of the IoT. The common aspect across these
protocols is using the IEEE 802.15.4 [10] standard as the fun-
damental network infrastructure, on which the more complex
networks are formed. This standard originated in 2003 and
has undergone various amendments over the years and, here,
the focus is on both the 2006 revision and IEEE 802.15.4e.
Typically, the standard defines the physical (PHY) and media
access control (MAC) layers of Low-Rate Wireless Personal
Area Networks (LR-WPANs), which describes WSNs. Three
possible operating RF bands (868/915/2450 MHz) are pro-
vided, which use different modulation schemes, support vari-
ous data rates and offer different topologies and security suites.
Here, the security analysis concentrates on the 2450MHz
band, which operates in the unlicensed ISM band, and the
IEEE 802.15.4 PHY and MAC layers. This area of the RF
spectrum is highly congested due to varying high numbers of
connected devices, potentially, running different protocols at
the same frequency, location and time. This level of congestion
requires efficient use of the spectrum and this aspect is
experimentally visualized using Tektronix’s digital phosphor
(DPX) technology and a real time spectrum analyzer in Fig.
6. Securing ISM band signals becomes increasingly complex
due to these levels of coexistence and congestion combined
with the rapid ability of the spectrum to change due to the
number of connected devices, demand, packet size or services
in operation. This coupled with the varying nature of the
networks physical environment, it becomes clear that WSN
security must contend with both malicious and unintentional
interference and intrusions.
A. IEEE 802.15.4 PHY
The IEEE 802.15.4 PHY layer (Fig. 3) has specifications
as per Table I and 16 available 2 MHz wide channels ranging
from 2405→ 2483.5MHz. Each specific center frequency is
calculated using (1), where Fc and i are the center frequency
and channel number respectively. This PHY uses direct se-
quence spread spectrum (DSSS) to split each outgoing byte
into two 4-bit symbols, four most significant bits (MSB) and
four least significant bits (LSB). Each symbol is spread to a
32-bit pseudo-noise (PN) sequence from a predefined mapping
table of 16 PN codes and this process is visualized in Fig.
4. The chip sequences are modulated using offset quadrature
phase shift keying (O-QPSK) with half sine shaping. This
signal was examined under normal operation by simulating
the bit error rate (BER) over a zero mean additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel for a range of energy-per-bit-
to-noise (Eb/No) ratios and results are shown in Fig. 5. The
packet error rate (PER) was incorporated by using a predictive
approach calculated using the probability of receiving an
incorrect symbol (Pe), given 16 different DSSS PN codes
transmitted in an AWGN channel. Assuming a matched filter
receiver the symbol error probability can be expressed as (2)
and the PER estimated using (4) and provided in Fig. 5, where
σ is the variance, erf() is the error function, L is the number
of codes and NBytes is the total bytes per packet.
The general PHY packet structure, known as PHY protocol
data unit (PPDU), is provided in Table II, where the MAC
frames passed to the PHY are enclosed in the PSDU. The SHR
contains a preamble, which allows receivers to synchronize
and lock onto the packet bit stream, and the start frame
delimiter (SFD), which marks the end of the preamble and
start of data. These values are predefined, for example, in
ZigBee the preamble sets all 4 bytes set to 0x00 and the
SFD is 0x7A. The PHR contains the number of bytes in
the payload, including the 2 byte frame check sequence
(FCS). The maximum IEEE 802.15.4 packet size is 133bytes,
including all headers, but some radios, like the CC2420, allow
the preamble to be increased to 17bytes [11]. From a security
perspective, the FCS and any encryption is on the PSDU
payload, meaning the headers are minimally protected.





















IEEE 802.15.4 PHY PARAMETERS
Parameter: 2.4 GHz PHY Value:
Data Rate 250kbps
Number of Channels 16
Channel Spacing / Width 5MHz / 2MHz





IEEE 802.15.4 PHY FRAME LAYOUT
Synchronization PHY Header PHY Service Data Unit
Header (PHR) (PSDU)
(SHR)
Preamble SFD Length Payload FCS






PER = 1− (1− Pe)2∗NBytes (4)
B. IEEE 802.15.4 MAC
Primarily, the MAC layer allows multiple devices to use
the same physical radio channel by employing carrier sense
multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) [11].
Prior to transmitting a packet, devices performs a clear channel
assessment (CCA) to ensure the channel is available. This











Fig. 3. Flow graph defining IEEE802.15.4 2.4GHz PHY
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Fig. 4. A flowchart visualizing the spreading of each byte
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Fig. 5. Simulated IEEE 802.15.4 O-QPSK 2450 MHz BER Curve &
associated predicted PER for a AWGN channel for a range of Eb/N0
Fig. 6. An IEEE 802.15.4 signal (ZigBee) coexisting with WiFi, Bluetooth
& another separate ZigBee signal
received channel energy to compare against a predetermined
maximum threshold, or carrier sense, which identifies the oc-
cupying signal and if an IEEE 802.15.4 signal is sensed, then
the channel may be busy even if the energy threshold is not
exceeded. If the channel is busy, devices back off for a random
period and try again up to a user-defined maximum number of
retries. Two modes of operation are used: beacon-enabled and
beaconless. In beacon-enabled mode, the coordinator transmits
regular beacons used for synchronization and communication
control. A superframe, which is divided into equal slots, is
used to synchronize data transfer between devices and the
coordinator by identifying active and inactive periods. Com-
munications take place during the active period, which may
consist of a contention access period (CAP) and a contention
free period (CFP). Nodes enter low-power mode during the
inactive period. In a CAP all devices use slotted CSMA/CA
and the first device that identifies channel availability starts
transmitting. A CFP uses guaranteed time slots (GTS) and
occurs at the end of the active period, which is immediately
after a CAP. In the beaconless approach, communications use
unslotted CSMA/CA and the PAN coordinator does not trans-
mit beacons, which means devices cannot be synchronized
with one another and no GTS exist. Acknowledgment frames
are sent without using CSMA/CA and are not encrypted [12].
The general IEEE 802.15.4 MAC data packet is provided in
Fig. 7 and shows how the PSDU encloses the MAC protocol
data unit (MPDU). The MHR contains information such as ad-
dressing and security, the payload includes data or commands
and the FCS is an error detecting code used as a security
PHY 

























Fig. 7. An expanded MAC sublayer view of the PSDU
technique for data verification. The auxiliary security header
is optional and incorporates information required for security
processing [13]. Similarly, the MSDU encompasses the net-
work frame and the network payload encases the application
frame, which incorporates a message integrity code. Other
MAC frames which exist are the beacon, acknowledgment and
command frames, which are explained in detail in [14].
V. SECURITY
Security defines various characteristics, which protect a net-
work from interference, especially when sensitive information
is being transmitted, ensures privacy and permits safety and
reliability. Therefore, certain operating goals are required and
these essential elements of security are as follows:
1) Confidentiality: The secrecy of critical transmitted data in
the wireless channel must be maintained by keeping the
contents from all but those authorized to have it. Critical
parts of the transmitted packets are encrypted prior to
transmission such that only authorized nodes can decipher
them. A strict key management system is essential as
privacy attacks can be used to degrade confidentiality and
can include eavesdropping and tampering.
2) Authentication: For the authenticity of packets, the re-
ceiving node should be able to autonomously assert that
the received packet has not been modified in transit (data
integrity), and it should also be capable of asserting from
which node the packed originated (origin authenticity).
Traditional cryptographic schemes such as digital signatures
can simultaneously provide both functionalities.
3) Availability: WSNs need to provide services whenever they
are required, resulting in a need to exhibit qualities of
robustness against a variety of impairments, both benign
and malicious. Some degree of resilience (i.e. the ability
to recover from faults), diagnostics (i.e. if services become
unavailable, it should be possible to identify why), or mit-
igation (packet re-routing, channel switching) is necessary.
4) Energy: In WSNs, energy is a key security concept as it is
a limited resource and must be optimized on each device.
This affects the ability to ensure each basic security concept
and the use of computationally heavy algorithms.
WSN protocols in use are susceptible to various attack styles
due to both the vulnerabilities in section III and incentives
created by the application areas. As the dependency on trans-
mitted information increases, the potential risk of privacy
and safety being compromised due to an attack rises. These
WSN intrusions are the largest contributor to link and path
problems and resulting packet losses can lead to avalanche
effects and potential network collapse [15]. Thus, techniques
are employed in WSN protocols to protect important infor-
mation and add resilience to attacks. However, it is likely
improvements are required because of the evolving nature of
both attack styles and WSN deployments. Below, the main
security techniques used in IEEE 802.15.4 are discussed.
• DSSS: This spreading technique provides resilience to inter-
ference. Every4 bits is spread to one of 16 predefined 32 bit
PN codes, which increases system redundancy because the
codes are chosen so that the resulting signal is noise-like.
Therefore, there should be approximately equal number of
ones and zeros in the spreading code and few to no repeated
patterns. This method provides immunity from various kinds
of noise, multi-path distortions and jamming and grants
security as only recipients who know the spreading code
can recover the encoded information. Essentially, certain
bit errors can occur, while maintaining correct reception at
the receiver by utilizing maximum correlation through, for
example, a maximum likelihood decoder.
• Frequency Hopping was added to the IEEE 802.15.4e
amendment to increase robustness against external inter-
ference and persistent multi-path fading. Multiple available
channel are used and only network nodes know the pattern.
• A FCS is an error detecting code used to detect changes in
the received raw data. The blocks of data being transmitted
get a checkvalue attached based on the remainder of a
polynomial division on their contents. In IEEE 802.15.4,
the contents refer to the PSDU, exposing the preamble. On
reception of the raw bits, the calculation is repeated and if
the check values do not match, the packet is corrupt.
• Cryptography: To stop intruders accessing sensitive infor-
mation by simply listening to transmitted messages, data is
encrypted before transmission. This provides data confiden-
tiality as the message is modified using a string of bits known
as the security key and, theoretically, only the intended
user can recover the original message. IEEE 802.15.4 only
encrypts the MAC payload [12] and supports the advanced
encryption standard (AES) and so, security depends on the
predistribution, initialization, use and storage of the keys.
• Message Integrity Code (MIC): This approach protects
against intruders modifying and resending messages, even
if the packets are encrypted. By including a MIC with each
transmitted message, data authentication is achieved because
a confirmation of who transmitted the message is achievable.
VI. EXPLOITATION
The aforementioned IEEE 802.15.4 protocol and its associ-
ated security techniques are susceptible to exploitation through
different attack styles [16]. For example, a specific denial of
service (DoS) attack aims to increase the probability of error,
Pe , to one. Thus causing packet losses and, potentially, node
links to collapse, nodes to become unreachable and network
failure. Privacy attacks pursue the interception of sensitive data
to degrade a network or for more threatening actions. For
convenience, certain WSN attacks are categorized as follows:
• Conventional jamming attacks, typically, aim to overpower
legitimate signals with spurious RF transmissions. While
higher jamming power increases effectiveness, it is also
easier to detect, as such, adversaries typically operate to
optimize the interference signal to maximize packet loss
while minimizing total broadcast power. Examples include,
constant, deceptive, reactive and intelligent jammers.
• MAC layer attacks react to the network protocol in use
by eavesdropping or sniffing on transmitted packets. The
analyzed results are used to implement network specific
attacks including replay attacks, spoofed packets, matched
protocol interference [9] or forcing a device to remain in
listening mode, which exploits CSMA/CA. Replay attacks
should be negated by the use of MIC, however due to hostile
deployment scenarios secrets may be accessible.
• Network layer attacks, generally, cause a DoS, a privacy or
an impersonation attack and include selective forwarding,
sinkhole, blackhole, Sybil and HELLO flood attacks.
• System coexistence is an innovative approach for attacking
WSNs. The ISM band is unlicensed and incorporates various
protocols as shown by the Tektronix DPX acquisition in
Fig. 6. The coexisting legitimate signals can attack a WSN
[11] when, for example, a secondary user (SU) occupying a
primary user’s (PU) spectrum causes interference or when a
specific user consumes all resources and deliberately denies
spectrum sharing.
Due to identified unique vulnerabilities and security holes,
the above attack approaches can be applied to the employed
security technique in IEEE 802.15.4 by using COTS hardware
and open source software. Currently available COTS devices
are becoming cheaper and more computationally powerful,
which allows various attacks to be implemented from a single
device. SDRs combined with open source software, like GNU
Radio, can apply various interference and privacy attacks by
using signal processing blocks and can mimic legitimate sig-
nals and packet structures by exploiting known WSN protocol
designs and bitstreams [9]. Receiving capabilities can support
attacks on specific frame sections, where certain security
measures are unimplemented. For example, listen for SHR
and focus attack on the PHR, thereby, affecting the frame
length and, likely, causing inaccurate packet reception. SDRs
or sniffers (TI’s CC2531EMK) can monitor a node joining
process where, potentially, encryption keys are disclosed or
can replay modified/unmodified packets. Notably, for WSNs,
devices can be both physically and/or commercially available,
leading to the possibility of gaining network access through
key extraction from memory, specially when no key man-
agement system is in use. In addition, without the use of
forward error correction, packets are more unreliable over
noisy or hostile communication channels, which aides the
process of intrusion by coexistence. Therefore, by using both
WSN knowledge and available COTS devices, specific aspects
of protected networks can, potentially, be compromised. This
clearly shows that exploiting WSNs is possible, even when
security techniques are used and improvements are required.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper concentrated on WSN security by analyzing
implemented network devices, deployment environments, ISM
coexistence and the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Defining the
diversity of innovative solutions requiring a WSN approach
expands the array of applications and deployment areas, most
notably the IoT, and incentivizes attackers. Unique WSN
vulnerabilities exist and have repercussions for providing
adequate levels of security. These vulnerabilities and essential
security operating goals were analyzed by focusing on the
fundamental use of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard in WSN
protocols and its associated PHY and MAC layer security
techniques. An experimental visualization of the ISM RF band
coexistence issues demonstrated additional complexity when
providing security. This paper indicated the existence of secu-
rity holes in the standardized IEEE 802.15.4 protocol, notably
in terms of preambles and headers, WSN deployments and
spectral coexistence. COTS devices and open source software
can effectively capitalize on these security holes, providing
evidence for establishing WSN security enhancements.
REFERENCES
[1] T. Vladimirova, C. P. Bridges, J. R. Paul, S. A. Malik, and M. N.
Sweeting, “Space-based wireless sensor networks: Design issues,” IEEE
Aerospace Conference, pp. 1–14, 2010.
[2] P. Park, S. C. Ergen, C. Fischione, C. Lu, and K. H. Johansson, “Wireless
Network Design for Control Systems: A Survey,” IEEE Communiations
Surveys and Tutorials, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 978–1013, 2018.
[3] S. R. J. Ramson and D. J. Moni, “Applications of Wireless Sensor
Networks - A Survey,” in IEEE International Conference on Innovations
in Electrical, Electronics, Instrumentation and Media Technology, 2017,
pp. 325–329.
[4] A. Addaim, A. Kherras, and Z. Guennoun, “Design of WSN with Relay
Nodes Connected Directly with a LEO Nanosatellite,” International
Journal of Computer and Communication Engineering, vol. 3, no. 5,
pp. 310–316, 2014.
[5] R. K. Yedavalli and R. K. Belapurkar, “Application of wireless sensor
networks to aircraft control and health management systems,” Journal
of Control Theory and Applications, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 28–33, 2011.
[6] C. Dragana, G. Stamatescu, L. Ichim, and D. Popescu, “Interlinking
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with Wireless Sensor Networks for Improved
Large Area Monitoring,” in International Conference on Control, Deci-
sion and Information Technologies, 2017, pp. 359–364.
[7] Y. Zhou, Y. Fang, and Y. Zhang, “Securing Wireless Sensor Networks:
A Survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 6–28,
2008.
[8] A. P. Abidoye and I. C. Obagbuwa, “DDoS attacks in WSNs: detection
and countermeasures,” IET Wireless Sensor Systems, vol. 8, no. 2, pp.
52–59, 2018.
[9] G. D. O Mahony, P. J. Harris, and C. C. Murphy, “Analyzing the
Vulnerability of Wireless Sensor Networks to a Malicious Matched
Protocol Attack,” in 52nd IEEE International Carnahan Conference on
Security Technology (ICCST). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–5.
[10] IEEE, IEEE Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Networks, 2015.
[11] G. Shi and K. Li, “Signal Interference in WiFi and ZigBee Networks,”
2017.
[12] I. Tomi and J. A. Mccann, “A Survey of Potential Security Issues in
Existing Wireless Sensor Network Protocols,” IEEE Internet of Things
Journal, vol. 4, no. 6, pp. 1910–1923, 2017.
[13] S. Farahani, ZigBee Wireless Networks and Transceivers, 2008.
[14] A. Reziouk, E. Laurent, and J.-C. Demay, “Practical security overview
of IEEE 802 .15 .4,” International Conference on Engineering & MIS
(ICEMIS), pp. 1–9, 2016.
[15] A. Förster, Introduction to wireless sensor networks, 2016.
[16] D. R. Raymond and S. F. Midkiff, “Denial-of-Service in Wireless Sensor
Networks: Attacks and Defenses,” IEEE Pervasive Computing, vol. 7,
no. 1, pp. 74–81, 2008.
